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ON SUPREME COURT COMMENTARIES AND
DEVELOPING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
David M. O'Brien*

3:
1980-1981. By Jesse Choper, Yale Kamisar and Laurence Tribe.
Minneapolis, Minn.: National Practice Institute. 1982. Pp. xvi, 348.
$30.

THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, VOLUME

I.

INTRODUCTION: SUPREME COURT COMMENTARIES

The proliferation of annual reviews of developments in constitutional
law might suggest, to some, an increasing public awareness of the Supreme
Court. To others, however, these commentaries and symposia reveal the
extent to which we have taken seriously Oliver Wendell Holmes's admonition that the rational study oflaw is "to a large extent the study ofhistory." 1
At the tum of the century, Holmes and other "legal realists" 2 successfully challenged the prevailing jurisprudence, thereby lending credence to
Charles Evans Hughes' controversial declaration: "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what judges say it is . . . ."3 Legal education
and public understanding of the Court's construction of the Constitution
has since remained profoundly affected.
Beginning in 1929, Holmes' alma mater conducted surveys (at regular
intervals) of the Court's disposition of major cases.4 Twenty years later, the
Harvard Law Review commenced annual reviews of developments in constitutional adjudication and the Justices' voting alignments. 5 To these reviews Harvard law professors added Forewords, or commentaries, on
* Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow (1981-1982), Russell Sage Foundation, New York, New
York. Assistant Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs,
University of Virginia. - Ed.
1. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
2. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 74-91 (1977) (legal realism characterized by emphasis on facts rather than doctrine, leading to recognition that judges often
make law rather than simply declaring it); W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968).
3. C. HUGHES, ADDRESSES 185 (2d ed. 1916). Compare Hughes' observation with that of
Chief Justice Marshall: "ffhe constitution's] nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819). For recent discussions of the Court's power of
judicial review, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); O'Brien, Judicial Review and Constitutional
Politics: Theory and Practice (Book Review), 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 1052 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Hart, The Business ofthe Supreme Court al the October Terms, 1937 and 1938,
53 HARV. L. REV. 579 (1940); Frankfurter & Hart, The Business ofthe Supreme Court at October Term, 1933, 48 HARV. L. REV. 238 (1934); Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1928, 43 HARV. L. REV. 33 (1929).
5. See The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HARV. L. REV. 119 (1949).
839
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broader judicial and jurisprudential trends. 6 There thus emerged a kind of
tradition of annual reviews and extended commentaries - chronicling, explaining, analyzing and criticizing the Court's rulings, term by term.
Annual reviews and commentaries indicate the extent to which lawyers
adhere to Hughes' view that the Constitution means whatever nine, or at
least five, members of the Supreme Court say it means in any given term. 7
Such reviews and commentaries ostensibly explain the Court's rulings to
practicing attorneys and to the laity. Moreover, they provide ample opportunity for professional criticism, and possibly instruction, of the Justices.
In some quarters, fuller explanation, if not more persuasive justification
for a particular decision, is thought commendable and even prudential. For
along with the Court's expanding docket, 8 the number of decisions handed
down with full opinions has increased incrementally. During the 1968
Term, the Court heard arguments in 140 cases and rendered 116 full and 10
per curiam opinions.9 By comparison, during the 1980 Term the Court
heard 154 arguments from the bench and disposed of 144 cases with full
opinions and another 8 byper curiam opinion. 10 More dramatic, however,
has been the rise in the total number of opinions (including dissents and
concurrences) authored by the Justices. The number of written opinions
almost doubled during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, from 138 opinions in 1953 to 243 in the 1968 Term. 11 The 1980 Term concluded with the
Justices filing no less than 318 opinions, surpassed only by the record
number of 352 opinions filed in the previous Term. 12
The increasing number of plurality 13 and five-four decisions 14 has
6. The first of these Forewords appeared in 1951. Jaffe, The Supreme Court, 1950 TermForeword, 65 HARV. L. REV. 107 (1951). Initially, the Forewords were brief introductions by
Harvard law faculty. E.g., Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term - Foreword: The Year of
the Steel Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 89 (1952) (8 pages). However, with Henry Hart's Foreword
to the 1958 Term, the Forewords became major, extended scholarly essays. Hart, The Supreme
Court, 1958 Term-Foreword· The TimeChartoftheJustices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959) (42
pages); see, e.g., Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term - Foreword· Freedom ofExpression in
the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. I (1980) (73 pages). For articles discussing the constitutional views of various Harvard professors, see Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV.
695 (1980); Deutsch,Harvard's View ofthe Supreme Court: A Response, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1445
(1979).
7. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
8. To be sure, the Court's docket continues to grow: from a bare 565 cases in 1920 to over
1,300 in 1950, over 2,300 in 1960, 4,212 in 1970 and 5,144 by the end of the past decade. See
Statement Showing the Number of Cases Filed, .Disposed of, and Remaining on .Dockets, Office
of the Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, for October Terms 1920, 1950, 1960, 1970
and 1980 (hereinafter cited as Statement of Cases]; Statistical Recap ofSupreme Court's Workload .During the Last Three Terms, 50 U.S.L.W. 3044 (1981). Still, docket size portrays little of
the prestige or power enjoyed by the contemporary Court in this "litigious society." See, e.g.,
G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
(1968).
9. See Statement of Cases, supra note 8, for October Term 1968.
IO. See id, for October Term 1980.
11. See Number of Printed Opinions and Memoranda Filed, Office of the Clerk, Supreme
Court of the United States, for October Terms 1953 and 1968.
12. See id, for October Terms 1979 and 1980.
13. From 1801, when Chief Justice Marshall discontinued the practice of issuing seriatim
opinions, until 1955, there were 45 plurality decisions. Comment, Supreme Court No-ClearMajority .Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 99 n.4 (1956). From 1955
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drawn criticism for contributing to confusion. 15 Annual reviews and commentaries seem salutary precisely because what the Justices mean and how
a majority of the Court will rule in the future appears problematic. Accordingly, practitioners - especially those contemplating appeals - appreciate
Holmes' "bad man" theory oflaw, 16 and thus generally welcome Supreme
Court commentaries that explain, and possibly predict, developments in
constitutional adjudication.
II.

THE

1980

TERM AND A SUPREME COURT COMMENTARY

There is no particular cause for celebrating yet another annual review
cum commentary dedicated to marking the passing of the Supreme Court's

Term. This symposium, The Supreme Court: Trends and .Developments
1980-1981, 17 nonetheless, deserves special attention for it brings together
three leading constitutional authorities: Jesse Choper, 18 Yale Kamisar, 19
and Laurence Tribe.20 The book is a transcript of their commentaries on
what they consider to have been the major recent decisions of the Court,
and of their subsequent discussions and responses to questions posed by
other eminent legal commentators, lawyers and judges (pp. 235-316).21 The
volume is generally well edited and often makes for lively reading, particuthrough the end of the Warren Court, 42 plurality decisions were delivered - an almost equal
number. Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974
DUKE LJ. 59, 60. From the 1969 Term until the 1979 Term, the Burger Court has rendered no
less than 88 plurality decisions. Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decision-making, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1127 n.l (1981).
14. See Note, Five-Four Decisions of the United States Supreme Court: Resurrection of the
Extraordinary Majority, 1 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 807, 916 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Davis & Reynolds, supra note 13; Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court,
95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982); Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980); Comment, supra note 13.
16. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 459 ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you
must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict . . . .").
17. 3 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-1981 (1982). This is the third volume in a series of edited transcripts of an annual
symposium on the Supreme Court, sponsored and published by the National Practice Institute,
with the cooperation of the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
18. Jesse Choper is Dean and Professor of Law at the Universtiy of California at Berkeley.
He is coauthor of Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments and Questions (5th ed. 1980) (with
Yale Kamisar and William Lockhart). He was awarded the Coif Triennial Book Award for
his recent book, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (1980). Choper was law
clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren (1960-61).
19. Yale Kamisar is the Henry King Ransom Professor of Law at the University of Michigan. His books include Police Interrogation and Confessions: Essays in Law and Policy (1980),
Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments and Questions (5th ed. 1980) (with Jesse Choper and
William Lockhart), and Modem Criminal Procedure (5th ed. 1980) (with Wayne Lafave and
Jerold Israel).
20. Laurence Tribe is a Professor of Law at Harvard University. His treatise, American
Constitutional Law (1978), received the Coif Triennial Book Award. Tribe was law clerk to
Justice Potter Stewart (1967-68).
21. The symposium was moderated by CBS law correspondent Fred Graham and joined
by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsberg of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Associate Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. of the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, and Paul Wojcik, managing editor of United States Law Week.
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larly when the discussion among the panelists produces some rather provocative statements that might not otherwise appear in print.22
Professor Choper attends to much of the recent litigation arising from
the persistently troubling reconstruction amendments23 to the Constitution.
He pays particular attention to cases resurrecting the thirteenth amendment24 and those involving the recurring issue of gender discrimination
under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause (pp. 19-50).25 In
addition, Choper devotes substantial space to a discussion of the Burger
Court's treatment of economic and social regulation under the fourteenth
amendment (pp. 1-18). Finally, Choper thoughtfully addresses recent cases
in an equally prominent area of contemporary constitutional adjudication,
religious claims under the first amendment's establishment and free exercise
clauses (pp. 51-68).26
Professor Kamisar dissects and renders more understandable (if not
more satisfactory) the Court's pronouncements on criminal procedure27
(pp. 69-149 and 171-78). He also tackles the important ruling in Chandler v.
Florida ,28 in which the Court approved of televising criminal trials (pp.
149-70).
Whereas Choper and Kamisar concentrate their analyses on several of
the Term's leading decisions, Tribe's sketch is broader. Endeavoring to
portray some of the more jurisprudential themes as trends, he canvasses the
Term's rulings on the commerce power29 and states' rights, 30 draft registra22. See 2 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1979-1980, at 196 (1981). A discussion of televised trials led to an exchange
between Kamisar and Graham over whether there should be a first amendment right to televise executions. Kamisar comments: "Maybe we need a certain amount of rousing of primitive instincts in this country. Maybe the great majority of people will not grasp the horror of
the death penalty until they see an execution on TV." 2 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE,
supra, at 198. Agreeing, Graham contends that, despite the controversy over television coverage of the Viet Nam War, the media's portrayal of the war perhaps changed the course of
events. 2 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra, at 199. The dialogue is stimulating,
regardless of what one thinks of the merits of such arguments and hypotheses.
The transcripts also contain some refreshing reminders of the hubris and the peril of predicting what the Court will decide in future cases. For example, after noting that in the previous symposium, Tribe had wrongly predicted the outcome of the draft registration case,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), Choper concludes in good spirit, "Well, you see just
about what our predictions were worth . . . ." 3 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra
note 17, at 27. The temptation to engage in prophecy, however, often proves too great. See 3
J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra, at 67-68.
23. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, xv.
24. E.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
25. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
26. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
27. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981);
California v. Pryscok, 453 U.S. 355 (1981); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
28. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
29. Hodel v. Virginian Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Kassel
v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
30. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
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tion,31 presidential immunity32 and separation of powers,33 judicial independence and remuneration, 34 and first amendment freedoms, 35 as well as
on due process36 and equal protection of the law37 (pp. 179-234).
The presentation and treatment of particular decisions by Choper,
Kamisar and Tribe are thus diverse; together they provide fairly good coverage of the 1980 Term. Unfortunately, they entirely neglect some important areas and rather significant cases. Noticeably, there is no mention of
American Textile Manefacturers Institute, Inc. v. .Donovan,38 a much
awaited and controversial case involving the authority of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to set standards for occupational exposure to toxic substances. In the previous Term, five members of
the Supreme Court, in Industrial Union .Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum lnstitute, 39 held that OSHA, when striking down a standard for
exposure to benzene as not "reasonably necessary" 40 under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), must demonstrate that compliance
with its standards will in fact mitigate the health risk of workers. Justice
Steven.s, however, joined the four dissenters - Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun - a year later in affirming OSHA's standard for
"cotton dust." 41 There, they held that the OSH Act does not require costbenefit analysis to buttress reasonably necessary and feasible health standards.42 The "cotton dust" decision thus clarified the earlier benzene ruling. American Textile Manefacturers Institute, moreover, may have broader
implications for agency rulemaking and resolution of future science-policy
disputes 43 and, more generally, the evolution of the "judicial/administrative partnership" in regulatory politics.44
31. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
32. Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
33. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
34. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
35. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); United States Postal Serv.
v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114 (1981); Heffron v. International Socy. for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61 (1981); Democratic Party of the United States v. Lafollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Chandlerv.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
36. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
37. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
38. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
39. 448 U.S. 607, 644 (1981).
40. 448 U.S. at 642-46 (interpreting § 3(8) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976), requiring that OSHA promulgate standards that are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment").
41. Occupational Safety and Health Standards - Toxic and Hazardous Substances, 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1982).
42. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506-12 (1981).
43. See, e.g., THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND
SAFETY REGULATION 8-10, 71-114 (R. Crandall & L. Lave eds. 1981); D. O'BRIEN & D. MARCHAND, THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (1982).
44. See, e.g., Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393
(1981); Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
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In addition to ignoring developments in administrative law, the ChoperKamisar-Tribe triumvirate also fails to discuss the Court's disposition of
cases under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act;45 first amendment challenges during the Term to regulations governing, for example, live entertainment;46 access to the broadcast media by candidates for public
office;47 and issues of federal common law.48
For jurisprudes and inveterate Court-watchers, every Supreme Court
Term holds a certain fascination, promising some favorite decisions. In this
regard, the 1980 Term was neither unique nor especially remarkable.
The Term, however, was eventful and momentous in another respect: it
marked the departure of Justice Potter Stewart, after twenty-three years of
service.49 Accordingly, conclusion of the Term brought the fourth change
in the Court's composition since the appointment of Warren E. Burger as
Chief Justice in June 1969.50 With the appointment of the ninety-first Associate Justice, new alignments on the bench would certainly emerge and a
range of constitutional doctrines could take completely new directions.
Justice Stewart's retirement was perhaps overshadowed by speculation
about the eventual performance of the first woman to sit on the high bench
- Sandra Day O'Connor.51 Choper, Kamisar and Tribe, likewise, speculate on the "O'Connor factor'' (pp. 31-34, 109, 117, 291-94, 307-08). Choper
remarks on Justice O'Connor's possible position on "women's movement
issues" (pp. 31-34) and abortion (pp. 307-08); Kamisar mentions her in connection with recent rulings on searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment (pp. 109, 117); and Tribe ventures to discuss her views on the
role of state courts in civil rights litigation (pp. 239-40). Choper, Kamisar
and Tribe also engage in a further exchange on Justice O'Connor and the
death penalty (pp. 291-94).
Such speculation is neither surprising nor altogether idle. Still, there is
a certain disappointment that in reviewing the 1980 Term Choper, Kamisar
and Tribe do not seize the opportunity to examine Justice Stewart's contributions to constitutional and statutory interpretation, and what his absence
from the bench bodes for future alignments and decisionmaking among the
Justices.
SUP. CT. REv. 345 (1979); Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667 (1975).
45. E.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
46. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
47. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
48. See Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Cla=ers Assn., 101 S.Ct. 2615
(1981) (holding that the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1444 (1981), established an exclusive federal legislative scheme for controlling pollution of marine waters); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S.Ct. 1784 (1981) (ruling that the
1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1981),
precludes federal construction of a federal co=on law of nuisance for interstate waters).
49. See, e.g., Powell, Justice Stewart, 95 HARV. L. REV. I (1981); Sandalow,Po/ler Stewart,
95 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1981).
50. The oaths of office were taken by Associate Justices Harry Blackmun on June 9, 1970;
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William Rehnquist on January 7, 1972; and John Paul Stevens on
December 19, 1975.
51. See, e.g., Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1981, § A, at 2, col. I.
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During his tenure, Justice Stewart authored approximately 662 opinions: some 304 opinions announcing the Court's rulings, 22 separate opinions, no less than 137 and 199 concurring and dissenting opinions,
respectively, and 114 additional separate statements.52 Stewart joined the
Court in 1958 at a time when the Justices were sharply divided into two
blocs - on the one hand, Chief Justice Warren and Justices Hugo Black,
William Douglas and William Brennan; and, on the other hand, Justices
Felix Frankfurter, Tom Clark, John Marshall Harlan, Jr., and Charles Wittaker. His voting, especially in the early years, established his reputation as
a "swing voter" and "middle-of-the-roader."53 Yet, during his last 11 years,
Stewart cast a dissenting vote only 16.3% of the time, 54 and in the 1980
Term, he supplied only 12 "swing votes."55 This is only 10% of the total
number of "swing votes" that Term, as compared with 15.3% and 13.5% of
such votes provided by, respectively, Justices White and Rehnquist. 56
Justice Stewart, to be sure, switched his vote from time-to-time on some
important issues, most notably the constitutionality of the death penalty
statutes.57 However, he also assumed the vexing responsibility for the
Court's opinions in a number of leading cases in which the Justices were
sharply divided. 58 In particular, he wrote for the Court in several crucial
first amendment cases, including those involving a first amendment "right
of access" in Pell v. Procunier, 59 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 60 and Gannett v. .DePasquale.61 In addition to other important concurring and dissenting opinions on the first amendment, 62 he authored opinions for the
52. From tabulations by the author.
53. He also has been described as the contemporary Court's "second moderate conservative" based on voting patterns and "disagreement rates." See, e.g., Israel, Potter Stewart, in 4
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 2921, 2925-27 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969) (observing that in the majority of cases in which the Court divided
along activist-passivist lines, Stewart clearly sided with those Justices most commonly identified as talcing the passivist viewpoint); Galloway & Lewis, Justice Stewart and Fourth Amendment Probable Cause: "Swing Voter" or Participant in a "New Majority"?, 22 LOY. L. REv. 713
(1976).
54. From tabulations by the author.
55. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 341 (1981).
56. From tabulations by the author, based on The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HAR.v. L.
REV. 91 (1981).
57. Compare Justice Stewart's opinions in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1977), with
Furmap. v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (per curiam). In Furman, Justice Stewart held
that Georgia's capital-sentencing system was unconstitutional, but in Gregg he upheld a new
statutory scheme which complied with the requirements set forth in Furman.
58. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); see also cases cited in notes 59 and 60 infra.
59. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
60. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
61. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
62. Some of Justice Stewart's most notable separate opinions on the first amendment include: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,598 (1980) (concurring opinion);
Herbert v. Lande, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (dissenting opinion); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726, 777 (1978) (dissenting opinion); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. l, 16 (1978)
(concurring opinion); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,570 (1978) (dissenting opinion);
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Court that expanded the law of standing63 and broke new ground in civil
liberties litigation.64
Still, perhaps most memorable are Justice Stewart's "[I] know it when I
see it"65 approach to defining obscenity, and his pronouncement in Katz v.
United States 66 that ''the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."67 There is no gainsaying that he left a lasting imprint on our constitutional constellation with a long line of opinions for the Court on the
fourth amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures"
and protection for individuals' "reasonable expectations of privacy." 68
Though solicitous of privacy claims - claims asserted more and more frequently during the decades he sat on the bench69 - Justice Stewart dissented, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 70 from the Court's creation (out of whole
constitutional cloth) of a right of privacy when invalidating what he termed
an "uncommonly silly law" 71 forbidding the use of contraceptives by married couples. Years later, he again objected to the Court's extravagant exercise of judicial creativity and ·reiterated that "there is no 'general
constitutional right to privacy' . . . ."72
"[T]he first duty of a Justice," Justice Stewart observed upon announcing his retirement, is "to remove from his judicial work his own moral,
philosophical, political, or religious beliefs."73 Indeed, perhaps one of the
hallmarks of Justice Stewart's jurisprudence, in the words of one commentator, was his "insistence upon limiting the scope of the Court's rulings" 74
and persistent concern about unbridled interpretations of the fourteenth
amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. In his opinion in
Landmark Co=unications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978) (concurring opinion);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (dissenting opinion); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (dissenting opinion); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (concurring opinion).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
64. Justice Stewart's opinions in the civil liberties area include: Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505
(1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516 (1960).
65. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
66. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
67. 389 U.S. at 351.
68. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-75 (1973); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-49 (1973); Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971);
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-35 (1970); Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300-03 (1966); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480-86 (1965);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (mem,).
69. See D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 51-78 (1979).
70. 381 U.S. 489 (1965).
71. 381 U.S. at 527.
72. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607-08 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
73. Washington Post, June 20, 1981, § A, at I, col. 1.
74. Israel, supra note 53, at 2933.
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Harris v. McRae,75 Stewart thus explained:
It is not the mission of this Court or any other to decide whether the
balance of competing interests reflected in the Hyde Amendment is wise
social policy. If that were our mission, not every Justice who has subscribed to the judgment of the Court today could have done so. But we
cannot, in the name of the Constitution, overturn duly enacted statutes
simply "because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with
a particular school of thought."76
Justice Stewart eschewed labels such as "liberal" and "conservative."
He simply wanted to be remembered as "a good lawyer who did his best."77
Constitutional history duly recorded his accomplishments and ultimately
will assess his contributions.
Ill.

DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND REVIEWING
THE SUPREME COURT

Although a final assessment of Justice Stewart's jurisprudence obviously
would have been premature and pretentious, Choper, Kamisar and Tribe
do seem remiss in not addressing the role he played in the 1980 Term's
further unfolding of constitutional law, especially in the area of fourth
amendment searches and seizures78 and a first amendment "right of access"
to criminal trials.79 In concluding with a brief review of their exposition of
the Term's leading cases, I shall raise some concerns about Justice Stewart's
role but focus primarily on three principal trends that Choper, Kamisar and
Tribe identify with the constitutional developments of the 1980 Term: failure to achieve consensus and articulate coherent, persuasive standards, judicial deference to other political branches, and assertive, self-protective
judicial independence.
The dilemma of judicial line-drawing80 is perennially vexatious, as suggested by Chief Justice Marshall's observation: "We must never forget that
it is a constitution we are expounding."81 His immediate successor, Chief
Justice Roger Taney, stated more fully the crucial problem in constitutional
interpretation:
The Constitution speaks not only in the same words, but with the same
meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its
framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States.
Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this
Court and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the
day.s2
75. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
76. 448 U.S. at 326 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955),
quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970)).
77. New York Times, June 30, 1981, § A, at 9, col. 3.
78. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-63 (1981); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 423-29 (1981).
79. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 583 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring).
80. See generally H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 338-46, 372-400 (4th ed. 1980).
81. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
82. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857).
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Debate in and out of the Supreme Court's chambers continues over the
proper exercise of judicial review and the Court's articulation of constitutional principles and standards.83
Two decisions in the 1980 Term, United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz 84 and Schweiker v. Wilson, 85 prompt Choper to reexamine
the Court's standards for interpreting and applying the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee to individuals challenging economic and
social regulation (pp. 1-18). In the twentieth century, the Court typically
and rather consistently (at least after its flirtation with "substantive equal
protection" analysis) 86 has employed a "minimal scrutiny" test or a "rational basis" approach when reviewing economic legislation. 87 Choper argues, however, that the standards governing that test have not remained
constant (pp. 1-18). During roughly the first third of the century, under F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 88 any legislative classification required a demonstrably fair and substantial relation to its legislative objective in order
to pass the Court's scrutiny. Between 1935 and 1970, the Court nonetheless
tended to adopt a less activist, more lenient standard, associated with Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co. ,89 under which legislative classifications
merely had to have some reasonable, conceivably possible and not wholly
arbitrary basis to pass constitutional muster. In the last decade, Choper
persuasively argues, the Court's holdings so vacilate between the Guano
and Carbonic Gas standards that it is difficult to ascertain the controlling
standard instructing the application of the "rational basis" approach to
socio-economic regulation.
In the Railroad Retirement case,90 the Court divided seven to two, with
Justice Stevens concurring and Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting.
Writing for six members, Justice Rehnquist invoked the lenient Carbonic
Gas standard in finding a conceivable, rational basis for a congressional
scheme that curtailed "windfall benefits" to railroad employees who were
eligible to receive both retirement benefits under the Railroad Retirement
Act and social security benefits because they had also engaged in some
nonrailroad work. 9 I Less than three months later the Court divided five to
four in Schweiker, 92 upholding a provision for supplementary security income benefits- a $25 per month stipend given to patients inpublic mental
institutions only if the institution received Medicaid on their behalf. This
83. Compare R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY (1977), with J. CHOPER, supra
note 3, and J. ELY, supra note 3.
84. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
85. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
86. See generally B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 204-22 (1980);
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword· In Search of Evolving .Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Mode/far a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV, L. REV. I, 8 (1972).
87. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
88. 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
89. 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
90. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
91. 449 U.S. at 174-78.
92. Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S.Ct 1074 (1981).
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time, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, observed that the Court's
"minimal scrutiny" test was not "toothless" and that the rational basis for
any legislative classification must be evidenced by a deliberate, considered
congressional choice.93 Moreover, here, Justices Powell and Stevens joined
the two dissenters from Railroad Retirement; with Justice Powell now arguing that, unless Congress explicitly articulates the purpose for the lines it
draws, the Court should employ the Guano standard and not presumptively
accept any conceivable, rational basis when sustaining congressional
enactments.94
The consequence, as Choper points out (pp. 14, 17, 262), is uncertainty
for attorneys who must advise clients and for lower court judges who must
decide cases in light of the Court's recent rulings. Yet, the problem is not
new nor merely that Justices occasionally fail to reach unanimity or are
"switching horses" (p. 16). For, as Choper notes in speaking to which standard - i.e., either the Guano or Carbonic Gas standard - he would employ: "[A]n act of Congress ought not be put in jeopardy because some
junior U.S. attorney could not think up any good interest to defend it" (p.
18). Implicitly, Choper recognizes that the Court expends its precious institutional capital when invalidating legislation95 and that, in Justice Louis
Brandeis's felicitous words, "the most important thing [Justices] do is not
doing." 96 Also tacitly (and unfortunately not more explicitly) Choper disagrees with Tribe's politically naive prescription for aggressive judicial
scrutiny cum imposition of "a meaningful requirement . . . upon the legislature that it act in the service of some coherent conception of the public
good" (p. 259).
Choper is no less helpful with regard to another perplexing problem in
line-drawing: cases presenting religious claims under the first amendment's
establishment and free exercise clauses.97 Indeed, religion in public schools
and governmental assistance to religious schools promises to be an area of
increasingly hard-fought litigation. In a series of cases,98 the Supreme
Court has ruled that to survive the strictures of the establishment clause,
governmental regulations or actions must have a secular purpose and
neither advance nor inhibit particular religions; moreover, they must pose
no threat of excessive governmental entanglement with religion. In tackling
this timely topic, Choper once again provides thoughtful and critical guidance. Notably, he suggests that the establishment clause should not be
interpreted to tum on whether a law's purpose or primary effect is to ad93. 101 S.Ct. at 1082.
94. 101 S.Ct. at 1088 (Powell, J., dissenting).
95. See generally 3 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra note 17.
96. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 80, at 391.
91. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713-20
(1981); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
98. See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653
(1980); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-72 (1975); Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-74 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971); Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 667-72 (1970); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222-27 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-36 (1962); Illinois ex rel McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-12 (1948).
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vance religion, but instead on whether it has a religious purpose and has an
effect that influences or compromises religious beliefs (p. 53).
In terms of judicial line-drawing, there is perhaps no comparable area to
that of searches and seizures, police interrogations and the rights of the accused. Judicial line-drawing in this area has indeed proven vexatious.
Over the years, the Court has constructed a seemingly endless, inescapable
labyrinth marked by numerous, subtle distinctions and exceptions. "Bright
lines" drawn one Term reverberate with uncertainties, inviting future revisions and redefinitions.
For a unanimous Court in Mincey v. Arizona ,99 Justice Stewart concisely stated a fundamental principle of fourth amendment jurisprudence:
The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that "searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 100
Exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, nonetheless,
have been more numerous and less clearly defined than suggested by Justice Stewart.
Specifically, and particularly problematic, cases involving automobile
searches have engendered several overlapping exceptions and special considerations. In Weeks v. United States, 101 the Court approved a warrantless
search by police when conducted incident to a lawful arrest. Some eleven
years later, in Carroll v. United States, 102 the Court provided another exception: the so-called "automobile exception" authorizing warrantless
searches of cars if police have probable cause to believe that they contain
evidence of a crime and exigent circumstances render it impractical for police to obtain a warrant.
Although these two exceptions occasionally run together, the Court has
periodically narrowed and broadened each, often without a majority of the
Court agreeing on the scope of either. Thus, on the one hand, in 1969 Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, narrowed Weeks to permit warrantless
searches of only those areas in the "immediate control" of an arrestee and
to require a valid warrant for searches of the rest of an arrestee's apartment,
house or car. 103
The Carroll doctrine, on the other hand, was also subsequently enlarged
and then contracted. In 1970, the Court ostensibly eliminated the secondprong of Carroll when upholding a warrantless search of an automobile
taken to a police station based on the police officers' probable cause and the
exigent circumstances at the time the vehicle was first stopped to arrest the
driver and search the car. 104 A year later in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 10s
99. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
100. 437 U.S. at 390 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
101. 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
102. 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
103. See Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). See also Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 263-66 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-37 (1973).
104. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970).
105. 403 U.S. 443, 453-73 (1971).
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for a plurality including Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, Justice
Stewart found impermissible a similar search of a car parked in a driveway;
thereby suggesting that Carroll extended only to those warrantless searches
of cars stopped on open-highways. Three years later, however, the Coolidge plurality dissented from the majority's opinion in Cardwell v.
Lewis, 106 which upheld a warrantless search of an arrestee's car in a police
impoundment lot after it had been towed there from a nearby public parking lot. The prevailing majority indicated that Carroll had been pushed too
far. Furthermore, while distinguishing the circumstances in Coolidge and
Cardwell to show that Carroll remained intact, Justice Blackmun introduced another, gratuitous consideration:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the
repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public
scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are in plain view. 10 7
The privacy rationale, as Kamisar astutely points out, "has nothing to do
with whether a car is 'a fleeting target for a search' or whether 'the car's
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained' " (p. 81 ).
The imposition of fourth-amendment-protected privacy concerns upon
Carroll by the Cardwell plurality not only obscured matters, but led to further line-drawing problems over the scope of permissible warrantless search
of the contents of automobiles. Prior to United States v. Chadwick, 108
handed down in 1977, police and prosecutors generally assumed that if Carroll sustained a warrantless search of a vehicle, then the doctrine also sanctioned the simultaneous search of luggage or containers found in the
vehicle. In Chadwick, over protests by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist,
the Court found unacceptable a warrantless search of a locked footlocker
placed in the truck of an automobile. There, Chief Justice Burger observed
that:
By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents
manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public
examination. No less than one who locks the doors of his home against
intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is
due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause. 109
That Chadwick limited Carroll was underscored two years later, in Arkansas v. Sanders, 110 as the Court found impermissible a warrantless search of
a suitcase found in a car. This time, Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
reiterated that at least personal luggage, if not other kinds of containers
found in vehicles during permissible warrantless searches, receives special
protection. A suitcase, he reasoned,
is not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from other locations. One is not less inclined to
106. 417 U.S. 583, 588-92 (1974).
107. 417 U.S. at 590. See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S. 753, 761 (1979); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 12 (1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
108. 433 U.S. I (1977).
109. 433 U.S. at 11.
I IO. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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place private, personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase
is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by other means or
temporarily checked or stored. Indeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to
serve as a repository for personal items when one wishes to transport
them.Ill
For fourth amendment jurisprudence, warrantless searches of
automobiles and their contents present, in the words of Judge Charles E.
Moylan, Jr., a "troubled area," 112 in part due precisely to the interplay
among Weeks's "incident to lawful arrest" exception, the Carroll-Coo/idgeCardwell line of cases on the "automobile exception" and the C/1adwickSanders introduction of a calculus of "reasonable expectations of privacy"
about various kinds of containers - e.g., footlockers, suitcases, brown bags,
etc. - found in a vehicle during a wanantless search. Even more strongly,
Justice Powell lamented that "the law of search and seizure with respect to
automobiles is intolerably confusing." 113
In the 1980 Term, two cases - New York v. Belton 114 and Robbins v.
California 115 - held the potential for clarifying and re.fining the lines
drawn by Weeks, Carroll Chadwick, and their progeny. Unfortunately, the
Court's opinions in these cases, both written by Justice Stewart, fell short of
fulfilling that promise.
In Belton, Justice Stewart wrote an opinion for the Chief Justice and
Justices Blackmun and Powell, and was joined with concurrences by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens. There, he held that ''when a policeman has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant ofan automobile, he may, as
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment"116 and examine the contents, including, as here, a jacket containing
cocaine in an unzipped pocket. Although Justice Stewart maintained that
Belton would "establish the workable rule this category of cases requires," 117 Kamisar, along with the dissenters, 118 points out the ambiguities
and uncertainties of the ruling. Specifically, does Belton authorize searches
of all of a vehicle's interior, including door panels, searches of locked containers or only of closed but unlocked containers, and searches of what kind
of containers - jackets, luggage, briefcases, brown bags, etc.? If Belton
does not apply to car trunks, then "what about station wagons and
hatchbacks, where the 'luggage compartment' may be reached through the
interior"; and indeed, asks Kamisar, "why doesn't Belton apply to the
search of a container incident to arrest in a small room or office" (pp. 9094)? The larger, looming question, Kamisar concludes, "is whether the Belton Court should have taken a 'search incident-to-arrest' approach at all or
whether instead it should have invoked the Carroll Doctrine" (p. 96).
111. 442 U.S. at 764 (footnote omitted).
112. 3 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 113.
113. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
114. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
115. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
116. 453 U.S. at 460 (footnote omitted).
117. 453 U.S. at 460.
118. See 453 U.S. at 463-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 453 U.S. at 472 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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On the same day Belton was handed down, its dissenters - Justices
Brennan, Marshall and White - joined Justice Stewart's brief opinion in
Robbins, with the Chief Justice and Justice Powell concurring in the judgment and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens dissenting. Finding
impermissible a warrantless search of a closed, opaque container holding
bricks of marijuana, Justice Stewart sought to clarify the Chadwick-Sanders
rule on warrantless searches of containers in which individuals had "reasonably 'manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free
from public examination.' " 119 Alas, the language of his opinion was
neither clear nor convincing to a majority of the Justices.
As Kamisar, after a careful, detailed analysis, puts it: "the Belton
'bright line' rule [does] not have a bright future ... [but] the Robbins plurality's 'bright line' rule has an even dimmer future" (p. 111). This indictment, at least of Robbins, has thus far proved correct. The following Term
in United States v. Ross 120 a new plurality, 121 led by Justice Stevens, overruled Robbins and sharply limited Chadwick-Sanders. Though undoubtedly not the last word in this most troubled area, Ross held that when police
have probable cause to stop a vehicle and to believe that contraband is
contained somewhere within, they may conduct a warrantless search of the
interior and contents of the vehicle. Moreover, the scope of that search is
governed not by the nature of the container found and inspected but "by
the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found.'' 12 2
In addition to Belton, Robbins and other cases involving the scope of
authority granted by warrants issued under the fourth amendment, 123 and
the scope of permissible police interrogations under the fifth and sixth
amendments, 124 Kamisar devotes considerable attention to Chandler v.
Florida.125 In Chandler, writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger reexamined Estes v. Texas, 126 concluding that Estes had not banned televised
trials and that there was not now a need to establish a per se rule against
television coverage of criminal trials. The Chief Justice held, for seven
members of the Court, that states may experiment with televised trials subject to due process considerations and constitutional objections raised by
criminal defendants to their convictions based on the broadcast coverage
their trials received. Justices Stewart and White, concurring only in the
judgment, would have had the Court explicitly overrule Estes and establish
a per se rule permitting televised criminal trials.
119. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,426 (1981) (quoting United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. I, 11 (1977)).
120. 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982).
121. Newly appointed Justice O'Connor, along with Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, joined Justice Stevens's plurality opinion. 102 S.Ct. at 2157-73. Justice Blackmun
filed a short concurring opinion as did Justice Powell. 102 S.Ct. at 2173.
122. 102 S.Ct. at 2172.
123. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Michigan v. Su=ers, 452
U.S. 692 (1981) (discussed by Kamisar at pp. 121-36).
124. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (discussed by Kamisar at pp. 137-48).
125. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
126. 381 U.S. 532 (1962).
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Agreeing with Justice Stewart, who had issued a sharp dissent in Estes, 127 Kamisar maintains that Chandler "really overturns" the earlier Warren Court ruling (p. 149). Kamisar disagrees with his co-author and Justice
Stewart's former clerk, Tribe, who views Chandler "not [as] a first amendment decision [but as] a due process non-decision" (p. 234). Indeed,
Kamisar reads Chandler against the background of claims to a general first
amendment "right of access" to judicial proceedings and the controversial
rulings in Gannett Co. v. JJePasquale 128 and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia . 129 Accordingly, he concludes that Richmond Newspapers and
Chandler yield compelling first amendment arguments for recognizing a
constitutional "right of access" on behalf of the electronic media to cover
criminal trials. He also finds occasion to endorse the provocative proposal,
advanced by Justice Stewart, 130 for television coverage of federal trial and
appellate court proceedings. ''The place to begin," Kamisar emphasizes,
"may well be the place that is likely to be the last holdout - the United
States Supreme Court" (p. 169).
While others may debate the wisdom of Kamisar's policy prescription
for televised appellate court proceedings, until Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Kamisar's reading of a first amendment "right of access"
would have appeared unpersuasively extravagant.
In Gannett Justice Stewart, writing for a badly divided Court, 132 held
that the sixth amendment provision for a public trial did not embrace a
right of the public or media to attend pre-trial hearings. He also argued
that the Court need not decide whether the public enjoyed a first amendment "right of access." 133 Justice Stewart's opinion, however, was so
broadly framed as to invite not only three separate concurring opinions 134
and a long dissent; 135 it also prompted no fewer than five Justices to attempt to clarify, explain and defend the ruling with off-the-bench comments.136 Because Justice Stewart stated no less than a dozen times that the
127. 381 U.S. at 601 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
128. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
129. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
130. Justice Stewart has said that:
Our courtroom is an open courtroom: the public and the press are there routinely, and
since today television is part of the press, I have a hard time seeing why it shouldn't be
there too so long as it is not a disruptive influence . . . . I think it is difficult to make an
argument to keep television out when you allow everybody else in.
Editorial Opinion and Comment: Justice Stewart Retires, 61 A.B.A.J. 954, 954 (1981).
131. 102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982).
132. For a further discussion, see O'Brien, The Trials and Tribulations of Courtroom Secrecy and Judicial Craftsmanship: Rejlections on Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, 3 COM,
& LAW 1, 3-33 (1981).
133. 443 U.S. at 391-92.
134. 443 U.S. at 394 (Burger, CJ., concurring) (emphasizing that the decision dealt only
with pre-trial hearings); 443 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring) (addressing first amendment
claims to a right of access); 443 U.S. at 403, 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasizing that
"the public does not have any Sixth Amendment right of access to such proceedings" and
discussing Justice Powell's understanding of the first amendment).
135. 443 U.S. at 406 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Brennan, White and Marshall, JJ.).
136. See, e.g., Stevens, Some Thoughts on a General Rule, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1979);
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public and press have no constitutional "right of access" to either pre-trial
hearings or trials, his opinion reached issues not raised by the instant case
and invited confusion as to the Court's ruling. The ambiguity of Gannett
had considerable impact on public and press access to judicial proceedings.
In the year following the decision, defendants, prosecutors, witnesses and
judges sought to close proceedings in no less than 13 federal courts and 259
state courts. 137
A year to the day after handing down Gannett, the Court unveiled Richmond Newspapers. There, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion found,
in the intersection of the first and sixth amendments, a right of the public
and press to attend criminal trials. 138 Justice Stewart likewise construed the
nexus between the amendments to create a constitutionally protected public
forum, and thereby endeavored to distinguish the decision here from his
opinion for the Court in Gannett . 139 Justices Stevens, White and Blackmun
added brief concurrences celebrating the Court's decision because, in Justice Blackmun's words, it was "gratifying . . . to see the Court wash away
at least some of the graffiti that marred the prevailing opinions in Gannett." 140 Justice Brennan's concurrence, joined by Justice Marshall, relied
on a more extensive theory of the first amendment. 141 The sole dissenter,
Justice Rehnquist, lamented the Court's activism and incursion on states'
rights. 142 Most significantly, however, Chief Justice Burger, obviously troubled by a declaration of unenumerated constitutional rights, 143 grounded
the Court's decision on the nexus between the first amendment's protection
of public forums and the sixth amendment's presumption of openness in
criminal trials. He assiduously and creatively justified the constitutionality
of open trials without committing the Court to an independent affirmative
right of access per se.
In Globe Newspapers, Justice Brennan was able to command a clear majority144 when striking down as violative of the first amendment a state statute permitting the closure of trials during the testimony of rape victims
Brennan Assails Media Criticisms of Court Decisions, Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1979, § A, at
12, col. l; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1979, § A, at 14, col. l; N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1979, § A, at 15,
col. l; N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1979, § A, at 13, col. I; Justice Marshall Hits Colleagues on Rights,
Seattle Post-Intelligence, June 3, 1979, § B, at 2. These articles represent the views of Justices
Stevens, Brennan, Powell, Blackmun and Marshall.
137. See O'Brien, supra note 132, at 13-20 & app.
138. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (White and Stevens, JJ.,
joined in the opinion and authored separate concurring opinions).
139. 448 U.S. at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
140. 448 U.S. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
141. 448 U.S. at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). For a pre-Richmond Newspapers statement of the structural theory, see Brennan,Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 17682 (1979). See also O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Righi lo Know", 7 HAS·
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 579 (1980); O'Brien, Reassessing the First Amendment and the Public's Right
to Know in Constitutional Adjudication, 26 VILL. L. REV. l (1980).
142. 448 U.S. at 604-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. 448 U.S. at 579-80.
144. Justices Marshall, White, Powell and Blackmunjoined the opinion authored by Justice Brennan in Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982). Justice O'Connor
concurred in the judgment. 102 S.Ct. at 2627. The Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and
Stevens dissented. 102 S.Ct. 2623, 2627.
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under the age of eighteen. According to Justice Brennan: "The Court's
recent decision in Richmond Newspapers firmly established for the first time
that the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to
criminal trials." 145
Kamisar thus seems to have correctly read the Court - ie., correctly
counted and predicted the votes. Nevertheless, I would, along the lines previously argued elsewhere, 146 still submit that he misinterprets by so broadly
reading the opinions in Richmond Newspapers and Chandler, and moreover
errs when applauding the creation of yet another unenumerated constitutional right. Line-drawing is always vexatious and at times aggravated by
the political dynamics of judicial decison-making and the interrelationships
of strong-willed, independent Justices. But, line-drawing becomes even
more vexing and perilous when the Court moves into what Justice Stevens
has called the "shadows" of the Constitution. 147
From the rather perennial and intricate problems of judicial line-drawing, 148 Tribe turns to a survey of various rulings during the 1980 Term to
uncover two more general themes: judicial deference to other political
branches and judicial independence (pp. 179-99, 201-11).
Tribe does not argue - as does his co-author, Choper 149 - that the
Court should defer to Congress and the executive branch on all matters
except those raising claims to constitutional rights and independence. No
less startling, however, he strikes the theme of "how selectively and how
manipulative!y the Court has begun to treat Congress's inaction" (p. 189).
He finds, on the one hand, in cases such as lJames & Moore v. Regan, 150 a
dangerous precedent "that congressional silence may sometimes be read as
a green light for compromising or confiscating private rights and private
claims" (p. 182). On the other hand, relying for illustrative purposes on
cases fil.ePennhursl Stale School & Hospital v. Halderman, 151 Tribe asserts
that "[t]here is a whole string of decisions in the United States Supreme
Court rejecting implied rights of action where Congress is silent or is ambiguous ..." (p. 189). "But you see what the Court is doing," Tribe rhetorically concludes, "[i]t is quite shamelessly, and I suspect unconsciously,
using its barometer - as to where it thinks, as a matter of general good
sense, the case ought to come out - as a way of reading the tea leaves of
congressional silence" (p. 190).
Accompanying the tradition of court commentaries - a tradition dating
back at least to Sir Edward Blackstone 152 and, as noted earlier, 153 carried to
fruition in the Harvard Law Review's annual surveys - is an inherent
145. 102 S.Ct. at 2618.
146. See O'Brien, supra note 132, at 20-33; see also D. O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIOHT TO
KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 125-46 ()98)),
147. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 n.23 (1977).
148. Tribe does discuss line-drawing problems with regard to the commerce power and
"Federal-State Relations in Constitutional Doctrine."
149. See J. CHOPER, supra note 3.
150. 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding the President's hostage settlement agreement).
15 I. 451 U.S. I (1981).
152. 1-4 w. BLACK.STONE, COMMENTARIES (London 1766).
153. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
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temptation to engage in hyperbole, rather than to remain content with mere
analysis and commentary on particular decisions. In other words, cases
must be "fitted" into "doctrines," and underlying "secret" agendas must be
uncovered and exploited. Tribe, in particular, appears to succumb to this
temptation in several ways.
Tribe's rendition of Dames & Moore and selective comparisons with the
Court's bitterly divided decision in the "Steel Seizure" case 154 (pp. 183-85)
overshadows Justice Rehnquist's careful language and reemphasis on the
narrowness of the Court's ruling - a ruling notably unlike either the Steel
Seizure or the Pentagon Papers case, 155 in which there was all but unanimity among the Justices. 156 So, too, when discussingPennhurst and the draft
registration case - Rostker v. Goldberg, 151 which he takes not as a war
powers case, as does Choper (pp. 34-40), but as a gender discrimination
case (pp. 190-92) - Tribe tends to treat the Justices as a more cohesive,
indeed conspiratorial, body than can be supported by the record. His
charge that the Court selectively manipulates congressional silence on socalled "implied rights of action" glosses over both the fact that individual
Justices from time-to-time vary in their views on congressional silence and
that, given the various possible combinations, nine Justices' shifting views
may yield some interesting, if not occasionally inconsistent or contradictory, results. Consider, for example, Justice Powell's opinions and reading
of congressional silence on private causes of action in Regents ofthe University of California v. Bakke 158 and, a year later, in Cannon v. University of
Chicago . 159 Even more disturbing, however, is when a Justice - such as
Justice Brennan in United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Weber 160 - manipulates congressional history in the face of clear statutory language: "[A]
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." 161
Tribe's exaggeration is perhaps inevitable given his broad canvas, but
sweeping generalizations are nonetheless more suggestive than enlightening, more provocative than persuasive.
From judicial deference to Congress and the executive branch, Tribe
turns to the issue of judicial independence. The Court confronted the issue
154. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
155. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (to which six
concurring and three dissenting opinions were added for a total of 10 opinions from a ninemember Court). By comparison, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), where Justice Black announced the Court's opinion, there were five concurring opinions and a dissenting opinion written by the Chief Justice and joined by two Associate Justices.
For a further discussion of these cases, see D. O'BRIEN, supra note 146, at 155-65.
156. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), Justice Stevens filed an opinion
concurring in part and Justice Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
157. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
158. 438 U.S. 265, 281-84 (1978).
159. 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
160. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
161. 443 U.S. at 201 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,
459 (1892)).
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in the 1980 Term in United States v. Will, 162 ruling that when Congress
enacts a schedule of cost-of-living increases for federal judges, among other
federal employees, it may be repealed only prior to the date of the scheduled increase. The issue of judicial independence has become especially
salient due to congressional proposals to cut back federal courts' jurisdiction in some areas of civil liberties/civil rights. 163 Here, Tribe imaginatively proceeds from Will's defense of judicial independence to a position,
based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 164 asserting rigorous judicial review of any congressional encroachment on the judicial
power (pp. 205-08). He concludes:
[T]he strongest argument is that, whenever Congress acts under any grant
of constitutional authority - whether under Article I, or Article III, or
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (to enforce the rights of a new
category of beings), or whatever - whenever Congress acts legislatively, it
acts subject, among other things, to the restraints of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [P. 208.]
Tribe's argument, not as fully developed here as elsewhere, 165 serves as an
important reminder that Congress and the executive branch, as much as the
Court, are subject to the Constitution.
IV.

CONCLUSION: COMMENTARIES, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION

Given our so-called "litigious society" 166 - increasing numbers oflawsuits, ever greater propensity to tum private matters into public issues,
transformation of political disputes into constitutional conflicts, and substitution of the judicial process for the political process - the proliferation of
annual surveys cum commentaries on the Supreme Court could perhaps
have been anticipated. The Choper, Kamisar and Tribe volume, though
not unique in capitalizing on our litigious proclivities, nonetheless remains
noteworthy for bringing together three distinguished, commendable constitutional scholars. Practicing attorneys, sitting judges and incurable Courtwatchers should find the volume provocative at times, and on the whole
beneficial as well as, one hopes, a salutary reminder to return to basics - to
the text of the Constitution as a measure both of the Supreme Court's opinions and the Court's commentators.

162. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
163. See, e.g., Constitutional Restraints upon the Judiciary: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. J-97-30 (1981);
Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction, 65 JUDICATURE 178 (1981).
164. See also Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
165. See Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out ofthe Federal
Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981).
166. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.

